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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
REPUBLIC OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
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Plaintiff/Appellant, 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the City of 
South Salt Lake (the "City"), R.O.A. General, Inc. ("Reagan"), and the Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") against claims filed by Republic Outdoor 
Advertising ("Republic"). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78 A-
4-103(2) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES1 
1. Did the district court correctly rule that Republic failed to exhaust its 
administrative remedies with respect to the permit issued to Reagan for the 
Wilderness Log Homes Sign when Republic had notice of the issuance and did 
not appeal the issuance to the Board of Adjustment within the statutory deadline? 
Standard of Review. "Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law." Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, f 7, 212 P.3d 547 (quoting Crestwood 
Cove Apartments Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, If 10,164 P.3d 1247). "Our review 
is limited to determining whether the district court correctly applied the summary 
judgment standard in light of the undisputed material facts/' SITL v. Mathis, 2009 
UT 85, f 10, 645 Utah Adv. Rep. 60. "In resolving motions for summary judgment, 
the court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party/7 Id. at f 9 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l) (Supp. 2005) provides: 
1
 The majority of the issues raised by Republic do not apply to the City. As 
such, the City will only respond to the arguments applicable to the City, which are 
numbered as 7 and 8 by Republic. 
2 
No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use 
decision made under this chapter, or under a regulation made under 
authority of this chapter, until that person has exhausted the person's 
administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and 
Variances, if applicable. 
South Salt Lake City Code sections 17.02.030 and 17.16.380 (2006) are reproduced at 
Addenda B and C, respectively. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 4,2004, Republic petitioned the district court in an appeal from the 
denial of a sign permit by the Utah Department of Transportation. (R. 1-6). In its 
amended complaint, Republic added a cause of action against the City, asking the 
court to order the City to revoke and cancel Reagan's city permit. (R. 2488-2500). 
The City filed a motion for summary judgment on May 8,2007, (r. 995-1012), 
which was granted by the Court on October 1,2008. (R. 3476-3488). After the Court 
entered a final order and judgment, Republic timely appealed. (R. 3500-3501). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The controversy in this case involves conflicting claims to the right to 
construct billboards adjacent to Interstate 15 in South Salt Lake City, Utah. Three 
billboards are generally at issue: (1) the Lindal Homes billboard ("Lindal 
billboard"), a sign permitted and built by Reagan; (2) the Deck Hockey property 
billboard ("Deck Hockey"), proposed by Republic to be installed within 500 feet to 
3 
the South of the Lindal billboard; and (3) the Wilderness Log Homes billboard (the 
"WLH sign"), a sign for which permits were granted, and which was constructed by 
Reagan approximately 500 feet south of the Lindal billboard. However, for 
purposes of the claim against South Salt Lake City, the only issue relates to the City 
permit issued to Reagan for its WLH sign. 
Republic receives city permit to build Deck Hockey billboard. In 2002, 
Republic applied for and received a City permit to build the Deck Hockey billboard. 
(R. 1709). However, in 2003 UDOT denied Republic's request for a permit on the 
basis that it was within 500 feet of the Lindal sign, and Republic was required to 
modify the sign so that it would not be visible from Interstate 15. (R. 3477-78). 
Republic has retained its city building permit for this street-oriented sign. (R. 1709). 
Reagan receives city permit for and builds WLH sign. On September 21, 
2005, Reagan applied for and received from the City a permit to erect the WLH sign. 
(R. 3479). After obtaining permit approval by UDOT, it constructed that sign in 
January 2006. (R. 3479-80). The WLH sign was within 500 feet of the proposed Deck 
Hockey location which was under appeal by Republic. (R. 3480). 
Republic undisputedly knows of the WLH sign. On February 28, 2006, 
Republic submitted a GRAMA request to the City, asking for copies of Reagan's 
permit application for the WLH sign. (R. 1009) (attached at Addendum A); (see also 
R. 1711, 3480). The application listed the address of the WLH sign and explained 
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that the WLH sign "has a direct impact on our sign permit issued by the city to the 
north." (R. 1009). Republic did not file an appeal of the WLH permit's issuance 
within ten days from that date. (R. 3480). 
Republic applies for Network Electric permit. On or about March 15,2006, 
Republic applied for a new billboard permit at the Network Electric location, in a 
location closer to WLH than its Deck Hockey site. (R. 3486). When this permit 
application was denied in April, Republic appealed that denial to the City of South 
Salt Lake Board of Adjustment, but in the course of this appeal attempted to 
"attack[] the City's decision to grant the [WLH] permit to Reagan." (Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to City's motion for summary judgment, at 5) 
(emphasis in original) (R. 1711). It attempted to modify its Network Electric appeal 
to include a challenge to the WLH sign on June 7,2006. (Id. at 6) (R. 1712) (See also R. 
2567). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its pleadings, Republic sought only one remedy with respect to the City: an 
order forcing the City to revoke Reagan's WLH permit on the grounds of its 
invalidity. However, the time for appealing the City's decision to issue the WLH 
permit had long passed before Republic's attempts to challenge the decision. The 
undisputed facts demonstrate that, even when applying the more liberal deadline of 
actual notice, the latest date upon which Republic could have timely appealed the 
5 
WLH permit decision was March 10, 2006. Republic did not file an appeal by that 
date. 
The recent decision of Fox v. Park City Board of Adjustment confirms the district 
court's decision. The date to appeal a permit's issuance is the date that the party has 
either actual or constructive notice that the permit was granted. If the facts that 
form the basis for the party's appeal can be ascertained by a review of the permit 
application, then the party is charged with knowledge of those facts once notice of 
the permit is proven. Construction on the WLH sign began in January 2006, giving 
constructive notice of the permit's issuance. Republic's failure to timely appeal the 
permit decision divests the courts of any jurisdiction to consider whether the 
permits were validly issued. 
Additionally, Republic's filing of the Network Electric application did not 
open the door for the Board of Adjustment to consider the merits of Reagan's WLH 
permit. The district court properly ruled that the Network Electric application was 
a collateral attack and an attempt to obviate the long-passed deadline relating to the 
WLH sign. 
Republic did not allege sufficient facts to suggest that it should be excused 
from failing to exhaust its administrative remedies. This court should affirm the 
decision of the district court. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. REPUBLIC FAILED TO TIMELY APPEAL THE ISSUANCE OF 
THE WLH PERMIT. 
In its Second Amended Complaint, Republic sought one remedy with respect 
to the City: an order for the City to revoke the WLH sign permit. (R. 2499). The 
district court correctly determined, however, that the undisputed facts show that the 
time to challenge the WLH permit passed without Republic filing an appeal to the 
Board of Adjustment. 
" A planning director's issuance of a building permit constitutes a 'decision 
administering or interpreting a land use ordinance/77 Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85, f 
22,200 P.3d 182 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-703 (Supp. 2007)). "Under Utah 
law, there is a specific exhaustion requirement with regard to land use decisions: 
'No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision . . . 
until that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies/" Salt Lake 
City Mission v. Salt Lake City, 2008 UT 31,16,184 P.3d 599 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9a-801(l) (Supp. 2007)). "This requirement 'serves the twin purposes of 
protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency '" 
Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, \ 28,44 P.3d 642 (citation omitted). 
Furthermore, this requirement is jurisdictional: "The exhaustion of administrative 
remedies requirement mandates that the litigant follow all of the outlined 
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administrative review procedures prior to a state court having subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the case/7 Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2009 UT 71, % 30, 642 
Utah Adv. Rep. 34. In this case, the administrative remedy provided by city 
ordinance is an appeal to the Board of Adjustment by an aggrieved party after that 
party receives notice of the permit's issuance. 
Republic argues that it attempted to exhaust its administrative remedies by 
filing its application for the Network Electric permit. It contends that an appeal of 
the denial of that permit was the only way that it could challenge the legality of the 
WLH permit. Republic's argument is not only contrary to what it argued in the 
district court, but it is unsupported by the law. In its pleadings, Republic previously 
contended that it had standing to challenge the WLH permit because of its adverse 
affect on its Deck Hockey application with UDOT. (R.3241). Since it was aggrieved 
by the WLH permit, it was required to file an appeal of that decision within ten days 
of the date it acquired notice of permit's issuance. 
City ordinance dictates that appeals of decisions relating to signs "shall be to 
the board of adjustment as provided in [Title 17]." S. Salt Lake City Ord. § 17.16.380 
(2006) (attached at Addendum B).2 Those provisions are as follows: 
2
 The Code has since been amended and no longer provides for appeal to the 
Board of Adjustment. However, this was the procedure in place in 2006. 
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K. Appeals to board of adjustment: 
1. Who May Appeal. Appeals to the board of adjustment may be 
taken by any person aggrieved or by any officer, department, board or 
bureau of the municipality affected by any decision of the 
administrative officer charged with the duty of enforcing the 
provisions of this title. 
2. Appeals Process: 
a. Such appeal shall be made within ten days after notice of any such 
decision by filing with both the administrative office or the city council 
from whom the appeal is taken and the board of adjustment a notice of 
appeal specifying the grounds thereof. 
Id. § 17.02.030(K) (2006) (attached at Addendum B). Two questions arise in applying 
these ordinances: (1) was Republic aggrieved, and (2) when did it have notice of the 
WLH permit? 
A, By its own admission, Republic was "aggrieved" by the City 
officer's decision to issue the WLH permit due to that permit's 
conflict with Deck Hockey. 
Republic argues on appeal that it had no standing to challenge the WLH 
permit until it had an application that was denied by the City due to the WLH sign. 
Aplt. Br. at 49. However, this position is inconsistent with its concessions below. In 
district court, Republic consistently claimed that its Deck Hockey permit supersedes 
and therefore invalidates the WLH sign. Indeed, it argued below that: 
if this Court upholds the validity of the [WLH] sign, then the Deck 
Hockey sign would be within 500 feet of [WLH] and would not be a 
permissible application. Thus, Republic clearly has standing to 
challenge the issuance of the [SSL] permit, as well as the UDOT 
permit, on the [WLH] site. The violation of the height and setback 
requirements allowed the sign to be placed where it should not have 
been placed, within proximity of 500 feet of Republic's sign. 
9 
(Republic's Reply Memorandum in Support of Republic's Motion for Summary 
Judgment Motion, 25) (R. 3241) (emphasis added). Additionally, in Republic's 
GRAMA request of February 28,2009, it stated that the purpose of its request was 
that "[t]his sign has a direct impact on our sign permit issued by the city to the 
north." (GRAMA Request, 2/28/2006) (Exhibit A of Affidavit of Shawna Winter) 
(R. 1009) (attached at Addendum A). Republic was therefore aggrieved by the 
decision to issue the WLH permit by virtue of WLH's proximity to Deck Hockey.3 
Further, Republic's argument that it only became "aggrieved" by the WLH 
permit once its Network Electric application was denied, and thereby acquired 
standing to object to the permit, goes contrary to public policy underpinning land 
use law, which requires speedy resolutions of disputes and finality in decisions. See 
Fox, 2008 UT 85, fflf 32-34 (balancing interests of property owner against interests of 
neighbors). Property owners are permitted to rely on land use decisions with a 
degree of certainty. In contrast, Republic's argument would strip away any 
semblance of finality. Any land use decision, no matter how old, would be subject 
to challenge as soon as a new property owner became aggrieved. In this case, it 
3
 Republic's complains that the City took the position that both the WLH and 
Deck Hockey permits were valid. Br. Aplt. at 55 n.38. If Republic disagreed with 
the city official's determination that they were both valid, then it should have 
challenged that decision, being aggrieved. 
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would leave Reagan's permit subject to challenge indefinitely, with the Board of 
Adjustment being required to review the legality of the WLH permit each and any 
time a competitor applied for a billboard permit within 500 feet of the WLH sign. 
This goes contrary to the policy of land use decisions, and the Court should reject it. 
The court should hold that Republic became "aggrieved" by the zoning 
official's decision from the moment the decision was made, in light of Republic's 
interests in the Deck Hockey sign. Republic's belief that it could not appeal the 
issuance of the WLH permit does not excuse it from complying with available 
administrative procedures. Republic was "aggrieved" on the day the permit was 
issued and could have appealed the decision after it received notice of the decision. 
As such, the only issue remaining is to calculate the date on which the ten day 
appeal period expired. 
B. Republic had both constructive and actual notice of the WLH 
permit and the location of the WLH sign long before it 
attempted to challenge the permit decision. 
The WLH sign was constructed in January 2006. (R. 3480). On February 28, 
2006, one of Republic's officers, Edward Rogers, made a Government Records 
Access and Management Act ("GRAMA") request for the WLH permit application. 
Republic would not have made such a request unless it had actual knowledge of the 
construction of the WLH sign. Based on this undisputed fact, the district court ruled 
that Republic had actual knowledge of the permit's issuance on February 28, 
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triggering the ten-day appeal period. Applying that period, it ruled that the last 
date upon which Republic could appeal the decision was March 10, 2006. 
1. Notice of a permit is calculated from the earlier of the date 
of actual notice or the date construction ensues,, 
In Fox v. Park City Board of Adjustment, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the 
date upon which an appeal period begins to run in land use cases. In that case, the 
City issued a building permit to a developer in July 2005, who commenced 
construction later that fall. Fox, 2008 UT 85,13. In January 2006, the Foxes, who 
lived next door, noticed that the rising building had literally reached unprecedented 
heights. Id. at f^ 4. Upon inspection of the building permit and application, the 
Foxes discovered that the building plans called for a pinnacle exceeding Park City's 
height restrictions. Id. Mr. Fox promptly filed an appeal with the Planning 
Commission on January 19, 2006. Id. at 15 . The Commission determined that it 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, and dismissed the appeal. Id. at % 6. The Park 
City Board of Adjustment and Third District Court made the same determination. 
Id. at f^lf 7-8. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court addressed when the ten day 
appeal period had begun to run. Park City argued that the appeal period should 
begin from the date the permit was issued; the Foxes argued that the appeal period 
should not begin until after the adversely affected party has notice of the violation 
of which the person complains. Id. at f^ 20. The Court rejected both of these 
12 
arguments, instead holding that the appeal period begins to run upon the receipt of 
notice - either actual or constructive - that the permit was issued. 
The court explained that this rule balances the interests of permit holders 
against those of the adversely affected. Running the appeal period from the date of 
issuance would allow permit-holders to evade review by waiting eleven days to 
begin construction. Id. at % 24. On the other hand, allowing an adversely affected 
party to appeal the permit upon the discovery of the violation "gives the permit 
holder no finality or assurance/' Id. at f^ 33. By instead running the appeal period 
from the date of actual or constructive notice of the permit's issuance, the rule 
"places on the neighboring landowners the responsibility of reviewing the available 
information to determine if they want to appeal the permit's issuance." Id. at ^ 34. 
The Court also explained that knowledge or notice of the decision "'refers not 
only to the administrative decision itself (e.g., the issuance of a building permit) but 
also to the facts constituting the basis for objecting to that decision.' Such facts are 
generally contained in the permit or permit application on file with the 
municipality." Id. at % 28 (citation omitted). In Fox, the facts forming the basis of the 
objection - the violation of height restrictions - were apparent in the permit 
materials, and the date for appeal began to run from the date construction began. 
Id. at f 41. 
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2. The undisputed facts demonstrate that the date to appeal 
the permit decision had long passed before Republic made 
any attempt to appeal it. 
In this case, the district court ruled that the date by which Republic should 
have filed its appeal was March 10, 2009, based upon the undisputed fact that 
Republic knew of the WLH permit. In light of the supreme court's subsequent 
decision in Fox, the district court appears to have given Republic one month more 
than the law required. This is because construction of the WLH sign commenced in 
January 2006, giving constructive notice to any interested party that a permit had 
been issued for a billboard at that location. Under a constructive notice theory, the 
latest possible date by which Republic should have filed its appeal was February 10, 
2006. Thus, summary judgment was appropriately entered against Republic for 
failing to exhaust its administrative remedies by that date. See Angel Investors, L.L. G 
v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ^ f 38,216 P.3d 944 (reviewing court may affirm judgment on 
unpreserved alternate ground where alternate ground is apparent on record). 
Nor did Republic take any action within ten days from actual notice. On 
February 28,2006, Republic submitted a GRAMA request for permits related to the 
WLH sign, which it identified by specific address (3015 South 460 West). Thus, 
Republic not only had constructive notice of the sign, but actual notice of the zoning 
official's decision and the proximity of that sign to Deck Hockey. Under an actual 
notice theory Republic would have had ten days to appeal the permit's issuance, 
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with a deadline of March 10, 2009. It failed to file an appeal with the Board of 
Adjustment, as required by ordinance, within that time. 
Republic argues that it exhausted its remedies by applying for permission to 
erect a billboard at the Network Electric location, appealing the denial of that 
application, attacking the City's decision to permit the WLH sign during that 
proceeding, attempting to amend its appeal to include a challenge to the WLH sign,4 
writing letters to City staff, and adding the City to this lawsuit. In light of these 
efforts, Republic asks the Court, "What more could Republic do?" Aplt. Br. at 50. 
The City suggests that Republic could have timely filed an appeal using established 
procedures, rather than belatedly crafting its own procedures to challenge the 
permit. Indeed, a timely appeal was the only thing that Republic could do to 
preserve its objection to the WLH permit. Where the legislature has imposed a 
specific exhaustion requirement, such as that in section 10-9a-801, it is strictly 
enforced. Nothing substitutes for a timely and procedurally appropriate appeal. 
See Holladay Towne Ctr., LLC v. Holladay City, 2008 UT App 301, f 9,192 P.3d 302 
4
 Republic refers to this modified appeal as having been "directed by SSL 
Board of Adjustments." Aplt. Br. at 51. Even assuming arguendo that the Board did 
direct Republic to modify its appeal as a challenge to the WLH permit, City 
ordinance does not grant the Board authority to extend the period of time to appeal 
a decision. It would be akin to this court allowing a party to file a belated appeal 
after the thirty day deadline had passed. 
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(considering argument that subsequent discussions with city staff and officials 
constituted "informal" appeal, and declaring argument to be "untenable").5 Its 
failure to exhaust the requisite procedures is fatal to its claim, and summary 
judgment was appropriately granted. 
II. NO EXCEPTIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION 
REQUIREMENT APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
Republic contends that its failure to timely challenge the WLH permit should 
be excused. It cites two recognized exceptions to the requirement: "unusual 
circumstances [1] where it appears that there is a likelihood that some oppression or 
injustice is occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to review the alleged 
grievance or [2] where it appears that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose." 
State Tax Commission v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989). 
In support of its argument, Republic assails the motives of city staff and 
argues that its Network Electric permit is being held in abeyance indefinitely. Aplt. 
Br. at 51. However, no claims relating to the Network Electric permit application 
were alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, and any issues relating to that 
5
 Indeed, even if Republic's attack of the permit's issuance through the filing 
of its Network Electric permit counted as a proper means to challenge the WLH 
sign, that application was untimely, being filed on March 15. And Republic's direct 
appeal of the WLH permit, filed June 7,2006 came long after the appeal period had 
expired. Thus, even assuming that the steps which Republic took were appropriate, 
they were still untimely. 
16 
process are not properly before the Court. (R. 2488-2500). In any case, these 
allegations are inadequate to qualify for an exception to the administrative 
exhaustion requirement. 
In Salt Lake City Mission v. Salt Lake City, the Mission argued that it should be 
excused from the requirement that it file CUP applications for four of the five 
proposed sites, and from appealing a decision of the Planning Commission 
regarding the fifth, due to "oppressive and unjust" city actions, and because its past 
experiences with the city showed that taking administrative steps "would be futile." 
2008 UT 31, f 12,180 P.3d 599. The Utah Supreme Court rejected these claims as 
inadequate. It first quoted from Patterson v. American Fork City: 
[The Pattersons] have argued that they would suffer irreparable harm 
if required to exhaust administrative remedies, and that the exhaustion 
process would be futile. In support thereof, Pattersons offer only the 
cursory assertion that City officials are hostile to their rights and that 
they have clearly pleaded sufficient facts indicating irreparable harm 
and the futility of any future attempts [to pursue administrative 
remedies]. We decline the apparent invitation to peruse Pattersons' 
lengthy list of allegations in search of specific facts supporting their 
claims of irreparable harm and futility. We note only that allegations of 
unfairness in the day-to-day relationship between Pattersons and City 
staff do not support a claim that the entire administrative appeals 
process is inoperative or unavailable. 
2003 UT 7,120,67 P.3d 466. It then concluded similarly, holding that even if the city 
did not follow "certain minor regulations and 'informal standard practices/" such 
actions were insufficient to show irreparable harm, oppression, or futility. Salt Lake 
17 
City Mission, 2008 UT 31, f 13. The court ultimately held that the appellant had not 
alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that "the City's administrative appeals 
process [was] inoperative/' Id. 
Similarly, Republic has failed to show that the appeals process - which would 
have begun with a timely appeal of the WLH permit to the Board of Adjustment -
was inoperative. Had Republic filed a timely appeal, the Board of Adjustment 
could have properly addressed whether the WLH sign met the standards and 
provisions of South Salt Lake code. Indeed, from Republic's account of the Board of 
Adjustment hearing relating to his Network Electric appeal, see Aplt. Br. at 18, it 
appears to be Republic's opinion that the Board would have ruled in its favor on the 
merits of its case, thus eliminating the need for any intervention by the court. 
One who is aggrieved by a city official's interpretation of ordinances has a 
duty to appeal that decision, or lose his or her right to challenge that decision. That 
person's neglect in doing so should not be lightly excused. Simply put, the 
allegations leveled by Republic do not excuse its failure to begin the administrative 
appeal process in a proper and timely manner. The existence of the WLH sign may 
be a burden on Republic; but an injury alone does not excuse the exhaustion 
requirement. Were it otherwise, the exception would swallow the rule. As the Utah 
Supreme Court explained, "[w]ere it otherwise, 'the omission of an imposed duty 
designed to advise an administrative body of an event which sets its process in 
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motion, [would] accrue to the advantage of the one who failed in the duty. This 
turns a delict into a triumph/' Iverson, 782 P.2d at 526. 
The district court properly ruled that none of the recognized exceptions to the 
exhaustion requirement applied in this case. This Court should affirm the order of 
summary judgment. 
III. THE FINDINGS ABOUT WHICH REPUBLIC COMPLAINS ARE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ENTERED AFTER EXAMINING THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS, 
Republic argues that the trial court entered findings in which it drew 
inferences in favor of the appellees, instead of in its favor. See Aplt. Br. at 55 n.38. 
Of the six listed, only the last two apply to its claim against the City. With respect to 
number (5), in which the Court ruled that Republic was required to file its appeal by 
March 10,2009, the Court was applying the law to the undisputed fact that Republic 
had actual notice of the permit decision on February 28, 2006, when it filed its 
GRAMA request. This was not a factual finding, but a legal conclusion. 
With respect to number (6), that the Network Electric application was a self-
inflicted injury constituting a collateral attack, the undisputed facts show that 
Republic failed to preserve its objection to the WLH permit by allowing the appeal 
period to lapse. It then filed an application for a sign which was within 500 feet of 
the WLH sign in an attempt to challenge the legitimacy of the WLH permit. This 
was attempted in a proceeding collateral to the WLH permit process, and one to 
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which Reagan was not a party. Thus, the district court appropriately concluded 
that, as a matter of law, this constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the 
WLH permit process. 
Moreover, even if the Network Electric application was not a collateral attack, 
it still was not the proper method to appeal the issuance of the WLH permit, which 
is at issue in this case. "Where the legislature has imposed a specific exhaustion 
requirement... we will enforce it strictly/' Patterson, 2003 UT 7, ^ f 17. Republic's 
failure to timely appeal the issuance of the WLH permit defeats its claim to have 
that permit revoked, and judgment as a matter of law against that claim was proper. 
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CONCLUSION 
If a party is aggrieved by a South Salt Lake City official's decision, that party 
must file an appeal of the decision within ten days after it receives notice of the 
decision. Republic failed to do so in this case. No amount of extraneous 
applications, letters, or appeals in collateral cases excuses that failure. Republic did 
not file an appeal of the WLH permit until June 2006, long after the ten days 
required for an appeal had passed. Having failed to timely appeal the decision, 
Republic cannot now be heard in District Court to challenge that permit. The court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, and summary judgment was 
properly entered against Republic. 
For the foregoing reasons, the City respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
the district court's grant of summary judgment against Republic's claims. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^ day of J g\WO *Y c J , 2010 
PAUL H.ROBERTS 
Assistant City Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on ~ t ^ u / - « t ^ F C-\ , 7> r> > o , I served two copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellee upon the plaintiff/appellant, REPUBLIC 
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, by causing them to be delivered by 1st class mail to its 
counsel of record as follows: 
Steven A. Wuthrich 
Attorney at Law 
1011 Washington, Suite 101 
Montpelier, ID 83254 
CC: Brent A. Burnett 
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P.O. Box 140858 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor Box 0858 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858 
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257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
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City Attorney 
JANICE FROST - 4575 
Deputy City Attorney 
Attorneys for City of South Salt Lake 
220 East Morris Avenue, 2nd Floor 
South Salt Lake, Utah 84115-3200 
Telephone: (801) 483-6070 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
REPUBLIC OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION; R.OA. GENERAL, 
INC. and CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE, 
Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHAWNA WINTER 
Case No. 040905336 
Judge Vernice Trease 
Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
ss 
I, Shawna Winter, state under oath and penalty of perjury that the following facts are true and 
based upon my personal knowledge: 
1.1 am the building permit technician for the City of South Salt Lake ("the City") and served in 
that capacity during the events discussed in my affidavit. 
1 
2. During the pertinent time period it was my duty to receive and respond to requests made 
pursuant to the Government Records Access and Management Act ("GRAMA") for records 
pertaining to building permits. 
3. Attached to my affidavit as Exhibit A is an accurate and complete copy of a GRAMA request 
received by the City from Republic Outdoor Advertising on February 28, 2006, requesting 
building permit records regarding a billboard located at 3015 S. 460 W., South Salt Lake, Utah. 
4. Attached to my affidavit as Exhibit B. is an accurate and complete copy of a GRAMA request 
received by the City from Republic Outdoor Advertising on March 13, 2006, requesting building 
permit records regarding a billboard located at 3106 S. 400 W., South Salt Lake, Utah. 
5. Pursuant to these requests I prepared copies of the requested records and delivered them to the 
requester. 
6. City records indicated that I did not respond to the February 28, 2006, request until April 1, 
2006. This was unusual for me as it is my custom and practice to respond GRAMA requests 
within ten days. 
7. There is no indication in the City records of the date I responded to the March 13, 2006, 
request. 
8. The City records attached to my affidavit were created and maintained during the normal 
course of the City's business. 
(signature appears on separate page) 
2 
2007. DATED this LJ day of 
Shawna Winter 
NOTARIAL CERTIFICATE 
I,
 cyjAY\V^jT f\\\Yffl,, certify that on the *% day of May, 2007, Shawna Winter, whose 
identity is known to me, appeared before me and signed the foregoing Affidavit of Shawna 
Winter in my presence and under oath. ^ 
Notary Public 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JENNIFER L. ALLRED 
220 E. Morris Ave., Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
My Commission Expires 
September 7, 2010 
STATE OF UTAH 
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EXHIBIT A 
1008 
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY REQUEST FOR RECORDS 
City of South Salt Lake, Community & Economic Development Dept 
220 East Morris Ave, South Salt Lake, UT 84115 
Phone Number (801) 483-6011 
Fax: (801) 483-6060 
Personal Information of person requesting record 
Name: " D ^
 A fcorck "Ecjuhlrc OJTdcw AftV • 
Full Mailing Address:. iC7.r **• Sect s f 
Daytime Telephone No: (S Q ( ^ J ^ ^ ^ O O _ Work; j £ ) H B r ^ °v cell: 4X0-0/37 
Address of property:, 
Permit Number. • • Parcel Number: 
Time frame (give beginning/ending years for search): 1JOQ5^~ X 0 f ) & 
Description of records sought (specify what your looking for i.e. application, inspections, finals, Certificate of 
Occupancy. Be as specify as possible); < ^ 
Yer»iH Applet** (A)*gA/ft^gfrfttt>fr); tAfftS^dAxub > U&naA&±. M&(>$ j &TC 
Description of purpose for records sought (reason must be described with reasonable specificity): ^ . 
<«&, T / i & *>/CVU hat^Qw dtr^<>- /i^pax^ OA ^ r ^ ^ K ^ r M J ' f t a O ^ b y T U c C f i y 
• I would like to Inspect the records (this entails reviewing the record within the office without receiving a copy to take with 
you and takes the same time, as indicated below, to be available). 
fcC I would like to receive a copy of the records. (Costs are usually $0.10 per page. .Full size plans usually $50 to $100. 
depending on size) 
^ I would like to receive a copy of the records and request a waiver of costs because (please attach information 
supporting your request for a waiver of fees): 
Q Release of the records primarily benefits the public rather than me 
« , Explain: 
JL- My legal rights are directly affected by the record and I am Impecunious 
• If the requested records are not public, please explain why you believe you are entitled to access: 
• I am the subject of the record (or guardian/parent if subject Is a minor or legally incapacitated) 
• I am the person who provided the Information 
Q 1am authorized to have accessby the subject of the record or by tho person who submitted the information 
(attach relevant documentation). 
Q Other. Explain ' 
• 1 am requesting expedited response. Please attach relevant documentation (i.e. proof of your status as a member of 
the media and statement that the record Is needed for a story/broadcast). 
S i g n a t u r e ^ 7 ^ ^ 0 . Date: 2 - / z Y / o £ 
Primary Classification of Record; Public j Private Protected „ „ Controlled Exempt 
10 
P Ul XI 
TRANSMISSIONS ACTIVITY REPORT ' * 
MAR-01-2006 WED 10:46 AM t 
% 
FOR: So. Salt Lake 801 483 6060 * 
•% 
t i 
-X 
t 
-% 
TOTAL T 22" 9 * 
% 
GRAND TOTAL TIME: 72H 20M 13S * i 
PAGES: 9985 * 
% 
0. DATE 
1 MAR-01 
START RECEIVER 
10:33 AM 3280955 
TX TIME 
T 22" 
PAGES TYPE 
9 SEND(M) 
NOTE 
OK 
B 
74 :
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EXfflBIT B 
1011 
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY REQUEST FOR RECORDS 
City of South Salt Lake 
220 East Morris Ave, South Salt Lake, UT 84115 
Phone Number: (801) 483-6070 
Fax: (801) 464-6791 
Personal In format ion of^person request ing record 
Name: T j g / * p.ypci . fe-ftfiub \ id r?ijidoo f Qg}€rtfsu-\s. 
/ s j , • 
Full Mailing Address: *•> '7 ^ ft! \S*sX- S f "
 : SLC , / / T T ¥ / / ^ 
Daytime Telephone No: ^fTy^COO Work: ^ 3 - ' g a ^ J Cell: V 2 Q " ^ 5 7 
Address of property: 3 ( Q £ S r > j f e - * / 6 f l GJ&<if 
Permit Number:" '* "*""'' " l g * i 1 j b a i r c l f e f ' ^ P a r c e l Number^ 
T ime f rame (give beginning/ending years for search): 
Description of records sought (specify what your looking for i.e. application, inspections, finals, Certif icate of 
Occupancy. Be as specify as possible): ^ * 1 ' £ - ti 
C&JrtC^itfh^ ° T " f ? / & & .^ i Vu r . / r / d ^Uy /? ^ y i / a / ^ V j L / U * ^ ^ . ( V L ? £Nin^<jtr~t^: 
Description of purpose for records sought (reason must be described with reasonable specificity): 
1 M P * £ ^ S 5y'6.ift **-£/• ^ hoofer*. <?f &&Oi)kk& 
Q I would like to inspect the records (this entails reviewing the record within the office without receiving a copy to take 
with you and takes the same time, as indicated below, to be available). 
Q I would like to receive a copy of the records. 
1 understand that I will be responsible for copy and research costs. 
^
 # (Costs are usually $0.10 per page. Full size plans usually $50 to $100 depending on size) 
JA I would like to receive a copy of the records and request a waiver of costs because (please 
attach information supporting your request for a waiver of fees): 
Q Release of the records primarily benefits the public rather than me 
Explain: 
Q I am the victim of a domestic assault on the record 
My legal rights are directly affected by the record and I am impecunious 
Q If the requested records are not public, please explain why you believe you are entitled to access: 
Q I am the subject of the record (or guardian/parent if subject is a minor or legally incapacitated) 
Q I am the person who provided the information 
Q l am authorized to have access by the subject of the record or by the person who submitted the 
information (attach relevant documentation). 
D Other. Explain 
• I am requesting expedited response. Please attach relevant documentation (i.e. proof of your status as a 
member of the media and statement that the record is needed for a story/broadcast). 
Signature: '^<--^^//! ird,'_^^? Date: . ~ 4 / / "* / V j /"I 
Requested records are generally available within 3-4 working days 
but may take up to 10 working days. 
You will be notified when the records are available to be picked up. 1 0119 
P D R A ^ F N C Y U S E O N L Y l U l K 
Addendum B 
17.02.030 Board of Adjustment 
A. The powers which may be exercised by the board and the proceedings on appeal shall be only on those 
matters as set out in UCA 1953, Section 10-9-12 to 14, and as established by the City thereunder. 
B. Any decision made must be approved by at least three members of the board of adjustment. No more 
than two alternates may act in the place of a member at any one meeting. 
C. Appointment. The mayor shall, subject to approval by the city council, appoint a board of adjustment 
consisting of five members, and such alternates as deemed appropriate, who shall serve without pay, 
except for reasonable and legitimate expenses approved by the city council. 
D. Clerk. The Community Development Department shall provide a person to act as clerk of the board of 
adjustment. 
E. Terms. Each board of adjustment member shall be appointed for a period of five years, provided that 
the terms of the first board appointed shall be such that the term of one member shall expire each year. 
The terms for alternates shall be five years from the time of appointment. 
F. Vacancies. Vacancies shall be filled for the unexpired term of any member whose term becomes vacant. 
Any member may be removed for cause by the city council upon written charges and after public hearing, 
if such public hearing is requested. Cause shall apply to actions both within or outside of board of 
adjustment meetings which compromise his effectiveness as an impartial member of the board of 
adjustment and are deemed by the city council not to be in the best interest of the city. 
G. Chair. The board of adjustment shall organize and elect a chair and adopt rules in accordance with the 
provisions of any ordinance adopted pursuant to this title. 
H. Chair's Absence. The chair, or in the chair's absence the acting chair, may administer oaths and compel 
the attendance of witnesses. 
I. Meetings. Meetings of the board of adjustment shall be held at the call of the chair and at such times as 
the board may determine. All meetings of the board shall be open to the public. 
J. Minutes. The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote, indicating such fact and 
shall keep records of its examinations and other official actions, all of which shall be immediately filed in 
the office of the board and shall be a public record. 
K. Appeals to board of adjustment. 
1. Who May Appeal. Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved or 
by any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by any decision of the 
administrative officer charged with the duty of enforcing the provisions of this title. 
2. Appeal Process. 
a. Such appeal shall be made within ten days after notice of any such decision by filing 
with both the administrative office or the city council from whom the appeal is taken and the board 
of adjustment a notice of appeal specifying the grounds thereof. 
b. The officer from whom the appeal is taken shall forthwith transmit to the board of 
adjustment all of the papers constituting the record on appeal. 
3. Appeal Stays. An appeal stays all proceedings in furtherance of the action appealed from, 
unless the officer from whom the appeal is taken certifies to the board of adjustment that by reason of the 
facts stated in the certificate a stay would, in his opinion, cause imminent peril to life or property. In such 
case, proceedings shall not be stayed otherwise than by restraining order which may be granted by the 
board of adjustment or by the district court on application and notice and on due cause shown. 
4. Appeal Hearing. The board of adjustment shall fix a reasonable time for the hearing of the 
appeal which shall in no case, except with the consent of the appellant, be later than thirty (30) days after 
the filing of papers constituting the record on appeal. 
5. Public Notice. The board of adjustment shall give public notice of the hearing of the appeal by 
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the city of South Salt Lake, notice published one time 
at least five days prior to the hearing, as well as due notice to the parties in interest, and shall decide the 
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same withm a reasonable time. 
6. Appearance. Upon the hearing any party may appear in person or by an agent or by an attorney 
L Judicial review. The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment may have 
and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom m any court of competent jurisdiction, provided petition 
for such relief is presented to the court withm thirty (30) days after the filing of such decision with the 
board of adjustment and such notice of appeal shall have been served on the board of adjustment by 
leaving a copy with the secretary thereof or filing such notice with the city attorney 
M. Expiration of Decision. All actions by the Board of Adjustment shall expire one year from the date of 
the decision unless the actions approved and or required by the Board are completed. 
17.02.040 General Plan. 
A. The city of South Salt Lake General Plan, dated April, 1997, together with the accompanying maps, 
charts, descriptive materials, is adopted. Any amendments adopted by the City shall be included m the 
plan. 
B. All Master Plans for specific areas or purposes, as adopted or established by the City, shall be 
considered an integral part of the City's General plan. 
C. Adopted or established plans shall serve as a guide m the decision making process regarding land uses 
in the city. 
17 02.050 Changes m Zoning. 
A Changes or Modifications. It is lawful for the city council from time to time, as necessity may arise, to 
change or modify any regulation or restrictions with respect to zoning or building or uses of land. 
B. Petition for Change In each instance where any person shall desire to have such change made, petition 
shall be made to the city definitely setting out such request and stating the change desired. 
C. Fees and Charges At the time the petition is filed requesting change with respect to zoning or building 
or uses of land as contemplated by this chapter, a fee shall be paid by the applicant Said fee shall be 
established by the city council by resolution. 
D. Referral of Petition. All petitions and any requests for changes proposed by the city council shall be 
referred to the planning commission for consideration and recommendation 
The planning commission shall consider the petition or a request from the city council and make a 
recommendation to the city council in accordance with state law. 
E. Notice. Before any ordinance shall be passed by the city council which makes any change or 
amendment to this title, a public hearing shall be held by the city council, notice of which shall be given m 
accordance with state law. 
F. Time Frames. Except as allowed herein or for those proposed by the city, denial of an application to 
amend the zoning map to reclassify any parcel of property shall prohibit the filing of another application to 
amend the zoning map to reclassify the same parcel of property, or any portion thereof, to the same or 
similar zone classification withm one year of the date of denial by the city council. Such prohibition may 
be appealed to the zoning review committee, which shall consist of two members of the planning 
commission and one member of the planning staff. Upon a finding by the committee that a substantial 
change m the circumstances or sufficient new evidence as submitted by the applicant in writing merits 
consideration of a second application withm the one-year period, the committee may allow an application 
to be processed in the normal manner. 
17.02.060 Enforcement. 
A. Conformity of buildings, land and open spaces. 
1. Use Conformity. Buildings, structures, premises or parts thereof shall not be used, occupied, 
erected, raised, moved, placed, reconstructed, extended, enlarged or altered except m conformity with the 
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17.16.380 Appeals. 
Appeals of the orders, administrative decisions or interpretations arising out of the provisions of 
this chapter, and any request for variances to the standards of this chapter, shall be to the board 
of adjustment as provided in this title. 
Addendum D 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGA I , I'.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
P.O.Box 11008 
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Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile (801) 355-1813 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATF OF T TT AH 
REPUBLIC OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTA-
TION; R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., and CITY OF 
SOUTH SALT LAKE 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
AND JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS AND ISSUES 
L •• >NCERNING THE LLNDAL, S S L AND RUSSELL 
PERMITS 
Civil No. 040905336 AA 
Judge Veraice Trease 
On December 14, 2007, the issue of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction Lame on for hearing 
before the Court pursuant to separate Motions for Summary Judgment brought by defendants Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT"), the Citv of South . i .»„: ("SSL"), and R.O.A. General, hie. 
("Reagan"). In particular, the Court heard argument on its subject matter jurisdiction to consider the 
propriety of certain permits issued by UDOT and SSL to Reagan, as raised in UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, SSL's Motion for Summary Judgment, Reagan's First Dispositive Motion (Motion 
for Summary Judgment on All Counts of the First Amended Complaint), and Reagan's Second 
Dispositive Motion (Motion for Summary Judgment on All Counts of Plaintiff s "Supplemental 
3 4 / F, 
Complaint"). Given the jurisdictional nature of the issues raised in Defendants' motions, the Court 
determined to resolve the question of its subject matter jurisdiction before considering Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment which was also set for hearing on December 14, 2007. 
Representatives of the Plaintiff, Republic Outdoor Advertising, L.C. ("Republic") were present 
and represented by counsel, Steven A. Wuthrich, representatives of UDOT were present and represented 
by counsel, Mark E. Burns of and for the Utah Attorney General's office, SSL was represented by its 
counsel, Dave Carlson, and representatives of Reagan were presented and represented by their counsel, 
Leslie Van Frank, of and for Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. The Court having reviewed the pleadings, 
motions and memoranda filed in connection therewith, having heard the argument of counsel, and for 
good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Court finds that the following facts relating to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction 
are undisputed: 
1.01. On or about May 13, 2002, Republic applied to UDOT for an outdoor advertising 
permit in connection with a proposed billboard on property known in this litigation as the "Deck Hockey 
property." 
1.02. UDOT's permits officer denied Republic's application on July 31, 2003, on the 
basis that the proposed location was within 500 feet of a sign location that several months earlier had 
been permitted to Reagan (the "Lindal" permit or the "Lindal" sign), and that the Deck Hockey permit 
would not be allowed under the spacing requirements of Utah law governing outdoor advertising. 
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1.03. After an informal hearing on Republic's appeal of that denial, UDOT's 
administrative hearing officer upheld the permits officer's denial of R epublic' s application for the Deck 
Hockey permit. Republic appealed to this Court. 
1.04. Republic asserts, inter alia, that IJDOT improperly issued the Lindal permit to 
Reagan. 
1.05. In February 1998, Reagan submitted applications to move three billboards in the 
vicinity north of the Deck Hockey property. Ui of those applicatioiis concerned the Lindal permit. 
UDOT's permits officer had denied those applications and Reagan invoked UDOT's appellate 
procedures to challenge that denial. 
1.06. On September 22, 1998, UDOT's administrative hearing oiTicet issued an t nxicr 
stating that further proceedings regarding Reagan's appeal "shall be conducted formally according to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-6 through 63-46b-1 I I I ial «)rder was never revoked. 
1.07. On February 1, 1999, UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued an order 
upholding the pennits officer's denial of Reagan's applications. Reagan appealed that decision to the 
Third District Court. 
1.08. On March 8, 2000, pursuant to stipulation between UDOT and Reagan, the 
district court vacated the February 1, 1999 UDOT order and remanded the case to facilitate settlement 
negotiations between UDOT and Reagan. 
1.09. As of May 2002, Republic knew that UDOT was considering issuing the Lindal 
permit to Reagan, but had not yet done so. 
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1.10. Republic also knew in May 2002 that UDOT had taken the position that it would 
consider Reagan's application for the Lindal permit before it would consider an application from 
Republic within 500 feet. 
1.11. In May 2002, Republic believed that the original building permit Reagan had 
received from SSL for the Lindal sign had expired, and that another SSL building permit that Republic 
held in the area would preclude UDOT from issuing the Lindal permit. 
1.12. Republic knew no later than November 2002 that a decision to grant Reagan's 
Lindal application would automatically be a decision to deny Republic's Deck Hockey application. 
1.13. Republic did not undertake any action to formally request to intervene in UDOT's 
proceedings concerning Reagan's application for the Lindal permit ("Lindal proceedings"). 
1.14. On January 23, 2003, pursuant to stipulation between UDOT and Reagan, 
UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued an "Order on Partial Settlement," finding that Reagan's 
application for the Lindal permit was not precluded by law, and ordering UDOT to immediately issue a 
permit to Reagan. 
1.15. UDOT issued the Lindal permit, and then denied Republic's application for the 
Deck Hockey permit on July 31, 2003. 
1.16. On September 21, 2005, Reagan applied for and received from SSL a permit to 
erect a billboard on property known as Wilderness Log Homes (the "WLH Property"), which is 
approximately 500 feet to the south of the Lindal billboard. 
1.17. On October 24, 2006, Reagan applied for and received a permit from UDOT to 
erect the billboard on the WLH Property. 
4
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1.18. Reagan built the WLH billboard in January 2006, and removed the Lindal 
billboard. 
1.19. The WLH sign was within 500 feet of the location where Republic proposed to 
build the Deck Hockey sign. 
-frrf^l*4* .20. So\etiiwin February 2006, a representative of Republic went to SSL offices and 
"ranted angrily to a nm^er &f staff about the City issuing a permit to Reagan to build a billboard at the 
Wilderness sije^ (July 5, 2007Vffidavit of Larry Gardiner). 
1.21. On February 28, 2006, Republic submitted a GRAMA request to SSL, asking for 
copies of Reagan's permit application for the WIH billboaid. 
1.22. Republic did not file an appeal of SSL's decisu n in ^<r {h w i * permit at any 
time within the next 10 days. 
1.23. Republic did not file an appeal of IJDOT's decision to issue the WLH permit at 
any time within the next 30 days. 
1.2-1 Iii a hearing on October 3, 2006 regarding a Motion to Dismiss brought by UDOT 
and a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Republic, this Court (Judge Hilder) ordered Republic 
to amend its complaint within ten days to join Reagan. The order on that hearing was signed entered on 
October 24, 2006. 
1.25. On October 10, 2006, Republic sent UDOT a letter demanding llml 1 DOT revoke 
Reagan's WLH permit and the permit for another Reagan sign that is across the freeway (the "Russell 
sign" or the "Russell permit"). The letter also demanded that UDOT make certain declarations regarding 
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the Russell sign, and also that UDOT declare that the Deck Hockey application preceded the WLH 
application and that the WLH permit was void on the basis of various allegations. 
1.26. During briefing and oral argument on the current motions, Republic conceded that 
it had no standing to make any challenge to the Russell sign or permit. 
1.27. On October 26, 2006, Republic amended its Complaint and filed its Supplemental 
Complaint in this litigation, bringing both Reagan and SSL in as defendants. 
1.28. On October 31, 2006, UDOT responded to Republic's October 10th demand, 
stating that "the statute prohibits us from initiating declaratory proceedings.. . . Although prohibited 
from investigating your claims by a declaratory action, I will direct the Department's staff to look into 
your allegations and take whatever administrative action they may find necessary. I have asked them to 
complete their investigation within 30 days and report back to me with their findings." 
1.29. On December 14, 2006, Republic filed with this Court a pleading entitled "Notice 
of Filing of Documents re: Exhaustion of Remedies on Wilderness Log Homes Sign and Supplemental 
Documents Concerning Lindal Cedar Homes Sign." (hereafter "Notice re: Exhaustion of Remedies"), hi 
that document, Republic stated, "More than 30 days have elapsed since the receipt of the October 31st 
letter and . . . no action has been taken to either correct or revoke the Reagan permits." 
1.30. Republic did not file or ask leave to file any new complaint until March 5, 2007. 
2. Based upon the undisputed facts, the Court renders the following general conclusions of 
law concerning the permits that UDOT issued for the Lindal and WLH signs: 
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2.01. This matter is on appeal to this Court pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. §72-7-508(4)(a), which grants the district courts "jurisdi iv\ ",^ K\ T!.:i . L • >\ *» all final 
orders of [UDOT] under this part resulting from formal and informal adjudicative proceedings." 
2.02. This matter is also on appeal lo (his Court pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ami. § 63-46b-15, which grants the district courts "jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final 
agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings. . . ." 
2.03. A review by trial de novo allows the Coi iii to review anew all legal and factual 
issues which were or which could have been presented to UDOT's administrative hearing officer at the 
time he made his decision to uphold the permits officer's rejection of Republic's Deck Hockey 
application. 
2.04. A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all available administrative 
remedies available. 
2.05. The requirement of exhaustion of remedies is excused under certain circum-
stances; those Republic argued are (i) when exhaustion would serve no useful purpose, (ii) where the 
agency has positively stated what its ruling will be in a particular case, and (in) where bias or 
prejudgment by the decision maker can be demonstrated. 
3. Based ilpon the undisputed facts, the Court renders the following conclusions of law 
regarding the permit that UDOT issued for the Lindal sign: 
ne Lindal proceedings were formal proceedings at all times after UDOT's 
administrative hearing officer entered his September 22, 1998 order. 
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3.02. Republic had a right to intervene in the Lindal proceedings, but could do so only 
by filing a signed written petition with UDOT before UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued his 
order requiring UDOT to issue the Lindal permit to Reagan. 
3.03. Since Republic did not intervene in the Lindal proceedings, Republic did not 
exhaust its available administrative remedies. 
3.04. Republic has failed to present sufficient evidence to raise any genuine issue of 
material fact that would that demonstrate that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies 
requirements applies. 
3.05. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims 
concerning the Lindal permit. 
4. Based upon the undisputed facts, the Court renders the following conclusions of law 
regarding the permit that UDOT issued for the WLH sign: 
4.01. Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), if the decision being 
challenged is an application, then "the request for agency action seeking review must be filed with the 
agency within the time prescribed by the agency's rules." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(4). Incorporating 
from Utah Admin. Code R907-1-3 the only appeals period prescribed by UDOT's rules, UAPA requires 
that a request to review a UDOT decision to grant or deny an application must be submitted within 30 
days. Though UDOT's rules might not specifically spell out a time limit for third parties to request the 
review of the grant of an application, UAPA fills in the gap. 
8 
4.02 Republic did not file a request for agency action seeking review of UDOT's 
decision to issue the WLH permit within 30 days after UDU I grain .•*; the permit, or within 30 days after 
Republic undisputedly had notice of the permit. 
4.03. The letter that Republic sent to UDOT on October 10, 2006, demanding that 
UDOT make certain declarations and also revoke the WLH permit did not operate to extend Republic's 
time to request that UDOT review its decision to issue the WLH permit. 
4.04. UDOT's October 31, 2006 letter denying the requests for declaratory relief in 
Republic's October 10, 2006 letter constituted final agency action regarding those requests. 
4.05. UDOT's failure to take any action to revoke the WLH permit within the 30 days 
stated in its October 31, 2006 letter constituted final agency action regarding kqumlic's request to 
revoke the WLH permit. 
4.06. Republic's Amended Complaint and Supplemental Complaint, filed with the 
Court on October 20, 2006, was premature and did not operate as an appeal of UDOl 's final agency 
actions regarding Republic's October 10th letter. 
4.07. Republic's December 14, 2006 Notice re: Exhaustion of Remedies was not a 
petition for judicial review that would satisfy the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b~14 or Utah 
Admin.CodeR907-l-16. 
4.08. Republic failed to timely pursue or appeal the administrative remedies that were 
available to it to challenge UDOT's issuance of the WLH permit. 
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4.09. Republic has failed to present sufficient evidence to raise any genuine issue of 
material fact that would that demonstrate that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies 
requirements applies. 
4.10. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims 
concerning the WLH permit that UDOT issued. 
5. Based upon the undisputed facts, the Court renders the following conclusions of law 
regarding the permit that SSL issued for the WLH sign: 
5.01. In this litigation, Republic has admitted that its interests in the Deck Hockey 
location were adversely affected by SSL's decision to issue the WLH permit, in that "if this Court 
upholds the validity of the [WLH] sign, then the Deck Hockey sign would be within 500 feet of [WLH] 
and would not be a permissible application. Thus, Republic clearly has standing to challenge the 
issuance of the [SSL] permit, as well as the UDOT permit, on the [WLH] site. The violation of the 
height and setback requirements allowed the sign to be placed where it should not have been placed, 
within proximity of 500 feet of Republic's sign." (Reply Memorandum to Reagan's Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Motion, p. 25). 
5.02. Republic was obligated to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing suit in 
district court challenging SSL's decision to issue the WLH permit. 
5.03. To exhaust its administrative remedies, Republic was obligated to file an appeal 
with the SSL Board of Adjustment on or before March 10, 2006, which is ten days after the latest date 
on which Republic undisputedly had notice of SSL's decision to issue the WLH permit. 
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5.04. Since Republic did not file such an appeal, Republic did not exhaust its available 
administrative remedies. 
5.05. Republic has failed to present sufficient evidence to raise any genuine issue of 
material fact that would that demonstrate dial any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies 
requirements applies. 
5.06. Republic attempted to collaterally attack the permit that SSL issued for the WLH 
sign by submitting a new application for a billboard ("Network Electric") even closer to WLH than the 
Deck Hockey proposed location; but a self-inflicted injury does not confer standing, nor can it extend the 
time for appeal. 
5.07. On appeal of SSL's denial of the Network Electric application, SSL's Board of 
Adjustment directed Republic to appeal the WLH permit, but the Board of Adjustment has no legal 
authority to extend the time to appeal. 
5.08. Subsequent demands that Republic made to SSL to revoke the WLH permit also 
did not operate to extend the time to appeal. 
5.09. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims 
concerning the WLH permit that SSL issued. 
6. Because Republic failed to timely or properly exhaust its administrative remedies, the 
Court hereby dismisses, with prejudice, all claims of Republic concerning (a) the Lindal UDOT permit, 
(b) the WLH UDOT permit, and (c) the WLH SSL permit. 
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7. Because Republic lacks standing to make any challenge whatsoever to the Russell permit 
or sign, the Court hereby dismisses, with prejudice, all claims of Republic referring or relating to the 
Russell permit or sign. 
8. The only issue/remaining for trial or further summary proceedings is whether^ 
31, 2003, there was a pufiiillcd-sign location within 500 feet M Republic'o proposed billboard site on 
' tile/Dock Hockey property. The deac dline for submitting further briefing on this narrow issue is extended 
to Monday, January 14, 2008. 
DATED this &* day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Steven A. Wuthrich 
Attorney for Republic 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
MARK SHURTLEFF, UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Mark Burns 
Attorney for UDOT 
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